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By Joseph M Fernandez* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The truth defence is defamation law’s oldest defence but it remains the least 
attractive defence to Australian media defendants because of its onerous 
threshold for success. This paper argues that the shackles on the truth 
defence are inconsistent with established freedom of speech ideals and the 
public interest in having a robust media. As a result society is constrained 
from enlightened participation in public affairs. This paper proposes reforms 
to alleviate the heavy demands of the defence so as to promote the 
discussion of matters of public concern and to strike a more contemporary 
balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation. These 
reforms employ defamation law’s doctrinal calculus to reposition the 
protection of reputation/freedom of speech fulcrum. The cornerstone of the 
reform proposals considered here is one that advocates a reversal of burdens 
so that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity of the defamatory 
publication where the complainant is a public figure; the matter complained 




Throughout history people have found ways to vindicate personal reputations from 
harm caused by the communication of defamatory imputations. They did so through the 
“duel” in the mid-sixteenth century.1 In the modern day, courtroom mechanisms are 
widely seen as offering a “civilised and urbane way” to seek vindication.2
                                               
* The author is the Head of Department of Journalism, Curtin University of Technology, Western 
Australia. This paper was developed from the author’s PhD law thesis, which proposes reforms to the 
truth defence in Australian defamation law. The author gratefully acknowledges earlier comments by his 
PhD supervisors Professors Michael Gillooly and Peter Handford of the University of Western Australia. 
Any lapses remaining are the author’s entirely. 
 One such 
mechanism, the law of defamation, is by far journalism’s greatest nemesis and Achilles 
1  Solove DJ (2007), The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumour, and Privacy on the Internet, London: Yale 
University Press, at 114.  
2  Solove, above n 1, at 114-5.  
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heel. Defamation law’s origin lies in an era that could not have anticipated the 
formidable twenty-first century challenges of regulating speech. While defamation law 
remains today’s primary tool for the vindication of reputation,3 in many common law 
jurisdictions, defamation law adopts an approach that offends against the fundamental 
legal principle that advocates a presumption of innocence.4 That is, in many 
jurisdictions the defamatory matter is, in effect, presumed to be false and the burden on 
the defendant wishing to rely on the truth (or justification) defence to prove the 
substantial truth of the allegations. This approach has been described as “one of the 
intrinsically nasty aspects” of defamation law.5 The reform argument, at one extreme, is 
that defamation law should be altogether abolished if we can do no better.6 On the other 
hand, no persuasive evidence is available to show that reputations are passé or 
dispensable and that defamation law should consequently be abolished. To compound 
matters, cyberspace is increasingly becoming the new arena for testing rules that have 
long applied to traditional mainstream spaces. Modern communications technology has 
exponentially energised freedom of speech because of its rapid and rabid ability to 
disseminate information.7
This paper focuses on the regulation of defamatory speech. It selects Australian 
defamation law, which has been described as “stringent [and] some of the harshest in 
the world”,
 The ability to spread words that harm is only the click of a 
mouse away for many people. The world is under increasing pressure to take a 
collective and more pragmatic approach to the regulation of speech generally and of 
defamatory speech in particular.  
8
                                               
3  Solove, above n 1, at 117.  
 as its case study locus. English defamation law occupies a similar position 
4  For example, see: (a) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2: Everyone charged 
with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; 
(b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11: Everyone charged with a penal offence has the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had 
all the guarantees necessary for his defence.  
5  Conley D and Lamble S (2006), The Daily Miracle: An Introduction to Journalism, 3rd Edn, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, at 410, citing Evan Whitton. 
6  Anderson DA (1992), “Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?” (Chapter), in Soloski J and Bezanson RP (eds) 
Reforming Libel Law, Guildford Press, New York, at 2.  
7  Joseph M Fernandez (2009), “Twitter, Trafigura and tyranny”, 28 October. Retrieved 9 November 2009, 
from <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2724599.htm> 
8  Conley and Lamble (2006), above n 5, 408.  
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and it has also been the subject of reform attention.9
The truth defence is defamation’s oldest, most obvious and principal defence – 
but far too few media defendants, who mount the defence, succeed. Many, discouraged 
by the defence’s onerousness, do not even attempt it. As a consequence the journalistic 
articulation of matters of public concern is stifled.
 This paper argues for a review of 
the doctrinal calculus governing the operation of defamation law with reference to three 
major jurisdictions – the United States, England and Australia – to meet contemporary 
realities and needs.  
10
 
 The reforms proposed in this paper 
dramatically alter the prevailing protection of reputation/freedom of speech equilibrium 
in Australia. Taking the approach advocated in this paper will tilt the balance between 
the competing interests of protection of reputation/freedom of speech, in favour of the 
latter but it does so in a measured way.  
2. REFORM PROPOSALS 
The scope of any reform of the law of defamation is necessarily broad given long-
entrenched principles that have been slow to keep apace of contemporary needs. This 
paper selects the truth defence for reform attention and while many reasons may be 
cited for this selection,11 it suffices for present purposes to identify one – it is “the 
principal defence to defamation actions”.12
The reason upon which this rule of law rests, as I understand it, is that, as the object of civil 
proceedings is to clear the character of the plaintiff, no wrong is done to him by telling the 
truth about him. The presumption is that, by telling the truth about a man, his reputation is 
not lowered beyond its proper level, but is merely brought down to it.
 At the heart of defamation law’s truth 
defence lies the following principle: 
13
                                               
9  For example, see Report of the Libel Working Group, Ministry of Justice (UK), 23 March 2010, 
Foreword, at 3.  
  
10  For example, see Dent C and Kenyon A, “Defamation law’s chilling effect: a comparative content 
analysis of Australian and US newspapers” (June 2004) Vol 9 No 2 Media and Arts Law Review 89. 
11  Joseph M Fernandez, ‘Loosening the Shackles of the Truth Defence on Free Speech: Making The Truth 
Defence in Australian Defamation Law More User Friendly For Media Defendants’, PhD Thesis, The 
University of Western Australia, 2008, Chapter 1 heading 1. 
12  Australian Law Reform Commission (1979), Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No 11, 
Para 120. 
13  Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd (1924) 25 SR 4, at 21. 
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Simply stated, the law does not protect undeserved reputations. The proposed reforms 
are aimed at facilitating the attainment of the objective enunciated in the above extract. 
These reforms are part of a larger package discussed elsewhere.14
 
 
A. The presumption of falsity  
Arguably the most important question to put to a plaintiff in a defamation action is this 
– are the imputations true or false? The established rule dispenses with falsity as an 
element of the cause of action in defamation thereby disregarding truth at a critical point 
in proceedings – at the start of the action. The prevailing blanket rule is that there is no 
place in the cause of action for a truth inquiry. This omission is particularly striking 
against the backdrop of the principle that no wrong is done to a person by telling the 
truth about him or her15 and that “[t]he central issue in defamation actions is a search 
for the truth.”16 It will be argued below that the truth element should be given a more 
prominent locus at the outset of the action, and that the proper way to go about this 
exercise is to reform the law so that the complainant should bear the burden of proving 
falsity, in addition to the traditional three elements – that is, the complainant should 
show that publication occurred; the plaintiff was identified; and the matter was 
defamatory.17
                                               
14  For example, see Fernandez Thesis, above n 11; Fernandez, JM (2010). Fixing the truth defence jalopy in 
defamation law: Reform proposals to foster public interest speech. Paper at the 19th AMIC Annual 
Conference, Technology and Culture: Communication Connectors and Dividers, 21–23 June 2010, 
Singapore.  
 This proposal is given the short hand term ‘burden reversal’ in this paper. 
This proposal, however, comes with qualifications set against the free speech-centric 
focus of this paper. The burden reversal would apply only where: (a) the complainant is 
a – public figure; (b) the matter complained about is a – matter of public concern; and 
(c) the action is against a media defendant. Further qualifications are recommended, for 
example, the burden reversal would not apply where the matter concerned is inherently 
incapable of being proven true or false, but are not discussed here because of space 
15  See text accompanying above n 13.  
16  Gibbons T (1996), ‘Defamation Reconsidered’ Vol 16 No 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 587, at 589 
(italics added). 
17  Gillooly M (1998), The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand, Federation Press, Sydney, at 
104.  
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limitations.18 Where the matter complained about is not a ‘matter of public concern’ or 
the plaintiff is not a ‘public figure’ or the action is not against a media defendant, then 
the cause of action burden on the plaintiff should be limited to the three traditional 
elements referred to above.19 In such situations, the chill on speech induced by not 
requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving falsity is an acceptable fetter on 
freedom of speech, if not altogether “a desirable chill that does not disproportionately 
infringe freedom of expression”.20 Such an approach is also consistent with the 
approach taken in the United States, where in more US jurisdictions, plaintiffs suing in 
respect of a matter of private concern still enjoy the traditional protection.21
 
 
1. The ‘presumption of falsity’ in the defamation context 
The notion of the ‘presumption of falsity’22 requires clarification, especially in light of 
the view that “the very conception of defamation involves the idea of falsity”.23 A 
finding of falsity is implicit in a defamation verdict – once the plaintiff has proved the 
imputation to be defamatory it is presumed to be false.24 Such an implication, however, 
rests on shaky premises if the question of falsity is not an ingredient of the cause of 
action.25 Second, at common law, since truth is “a complete defence”,26 evidence of the 
truth of the defamatory matter cannot be given unless truth is pleaded in justification.27
                                               
18  As to inherent incapability of proving truth or falsity, see New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
(October 1995), Defamation, Report No 75, Para 4.15. For other ‘qualifications to compensate for the 
burden reversal proposed see generally Fernandez PhD Thesis, above n 11. 
 
These principles appear to have given rise to the view that “at common law, a plea of 
the general issue without a plea in justification admits that the matter complained of was 
19  See text accompanying above n 17.  
20  Milo D (2008), Defamation and Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at 184. 
21  Garziano v EI du Pont de Nemours & Co, 818 F 2d 380 (5th Cir 1987). 
22  For a historical account of the presumption of falsity see Hirth JA (2004), ‘Laying to Rest the 
Ecclesiastical Presumption of Falsity: Why the Missouri Approved Instructions Should Include Falsity as 
an Element of Defamation’, 69 Missouri Law Review 529. 
23  See TA Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906), Vol 1, at 275 cited in Howden v ‘Truth’ and 
‘Sportsman’ Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 416, Evatt J, at 431. 
24  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 2.6.  
25  Spencer Bower (1990), A Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation With a Continuous Commentary 
and Appendices, 2nd edn, Legal Books, Redfern, NSW, at 237; Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, Cave J, at 37. 
26  Milmo P and Rogers WVH (2004), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 10th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 
7. 
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false.”28 Thus, if the defendant did not plead the truth defence, he or she is not permitted 
to provide evidence of the truth of the defamatory matter. And, further, if the defendant 
has not pleaded the truth defence, it is taken as an admission that the matter complained 
of was false, and that therefore, there is a presumption of falsity against the defendant. 
The difficulty with such an approach is that the failure to justify (or plead the truth 
defence) cannot logically amount to a failure to deny the truth of the defamatory matter 
if falsity is not an element in determining whether the matter is defamatory.29
 
 
2. Difficulties concerning the ‘presumption of falsity’ notion 
A number of difficulties arise in this area and it may be seen in the widely conflicting 
views as to whether there is, in the first place, a presumption of falsity against the 
defendant who does not plead the truth defence. On the one hand it is said that there is a 
presumption of falsity. Armstrong et al have noted that a person who claims to have 
been defamed in the media “has a distinct advantage. The law presumes that the media 
report is false.”30 Likewise, Bower and Mitchell, in their respective works, have stated 
that if the defendant does not prove the truth of the defamatory matter the law assumes 
it to be false.31 In Allworth v John Fairfax32 Higgins J said: “Where truth alone is a 
defence, whilst there is no presumption of falsity, a failure to plead justification will be 
taken as an admission of falsity.”33
                                                                                                                                                  
27  Australian Consolidated Press v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185, Windeyer J, at 204. 
 While Higgins J appears to draw a distinction 
between a “presumption” and an “admission”, from a defendant’s perspective there is 
no real difference. As for the view that there is no presumption of falsity if a defendant 
does not plead the truth defence, Windeyer J has stated that there “appears to be no 
28  Australian Consolidated Press v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185, Windeyer J, at 204. 
29  George P (2006), Defamation Law in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, NSW, at 246.  
30  Armstrong M, Lindsay D and Watterson R (1995), Media Law in Australia, 3rd Edn, Oxford University 
Press, South Melbourne, at 31 (italics added). See, however, a qualification in this text (Chapter 3 
endnote 1, in reference to jurisdictions where truth was not a complete defence in the sense that this 
defence also required the defendant pleading truth to also show that the material was published in the 
public interest or for the public benefit. In such circumstances, Armstrong et al state, it is better to avoid 
the notion of presumption of falsity and say that the defendant carries the burden of proving truth. See 
also Singleton v Ffrench (1986) 5 NSWLR 425. 
31  Bower (1990), above n 25, at 237. See also Mitchell P (2005), The Making of the Modern Law of 
Defamation, Hart Publishing, Oxford, at 94; and Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Anor v Popovic (2003) 9 
VR 1, at 57.  
32  Allworth v John Fairfax (1993) 113 FLR 254. 
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logical presumption either way.”34 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission has 
gone even further to say that the assertion that there is a presumption of falsity of a 
defamatory imputation is “not useful and may be mischievous”35 in that it gives a 
foothold in a fiction for the magnification of damages and perhaps in other ways” 
because no one can foretell what will be the consequences of treating as a fact 
something which may not be a fact.”36
 
 Whether the view is taken that there is a 
presumption or that there is no presumption, the better view is that the ‘presumption of 
falsity’ is just a loose way of describing the position that the onus of proving truth is on 
the defendant. Such an onus is too heavy for a media defendant to discharge and this 
consequently impairs the proper discussion of matters of legitimate public interest. 
3. Arguments against burden reversal  
In favour of the approach that does not impose a burden of proof of falsity on the 
plaintiff, it may be argued that because it is the defendant who has made a charge 
against the claimant, the claimant is entitled to assert that she or he is innocent until 
proven guilty.37 On this approach a person is deemed to have a good reputation in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary.38 As such, the view that the defendant is presumed 
guilty until proven innocent is “arguably misplaced”.39 A second argument is that it is 
“too onerous” to put the burden of falsity on the plaintiff because the plaintiff should 
not be asked to prove a negative.40
                                                                                                                                                  
33  Allworth v John Fairfax (1993) 113 FLR 254, at 266. 
 Furthermore, it is said, a claimant who faced general 
charges of wrongdoing, such as an accusation that a politician was associated with 
organised crime, might otherwise be placed in an extremely difficult position and might 
34  Australian Consolidated Press v Uren (1966) 117 CLR, at 205. 
35  New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1971), Defamation, Report No 11, Appendix D – Notes on 
Proposed Bill and Rules, Para 35. 
36  New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1971), Defamation, Report No 11, Appendix D – Notes on 
Proposed Bill and Rules, Para 35. 
37  Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, 269.  
38  New South Wales Law Reform Commission (August 1993), Defamation, Discussion Paper No 32, Para 
6.33.  
39  Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, 269. 
40   NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.19. 
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find it difficult to prove a negative.41 A third argument is that the plaintiff may be asked 
to disprove a vague defamatory statement whose meaning is difficult to determine, for 
example, that the plaintiff is a corrupt businessman.42 A fourth argument is that the 
presumption induces a spirit of caution among publishers,43 that is, while it produces a 
chilling effect that effect is justified or desirable, because it acts as a powerful deterrent 
to the publication of false information.44
 
 These arguments, however, are far outweighed 
by the arguments set out in the next section. 
4. Arguments in favour of burden reversal 
Six main arguments may be made in favour of placing the burden of proof of falsity on 
the plaintiff. First, the same argument above in respect of the presumption of innocence 
may be applied to the defendant too. The present approach deems the defendant guilty 
until proven innocent and that approach goes against the grain of hallowed legal 
principles.45 Second, the present approach can be viewed as contradictory to an 
important tort principle, that is, “the placing on the defendant of the burden of proof on 
what is (or should be) the central issue in proceedings having as their purpose the 
vindication of reputation is out of line with the general approach in tort law”.46 
Defamation law’s approach in relation to the present burden evokes the following 
question: “In every other civil action claimants must prove their case in order to win 
damages: why should libel be any different?”47 The present rule is arguably anomalous 
in the context of a system of civil liability, which generally requires a plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant was at fault.48
                                               
41  Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, at 269 (references omitted). For other arguments opposing the 
view that the plaintiff should bear the onus of proving falsity in defamation cases see, for example, 
England and Wales, Supreme Court Procedure Committee (July 1991), Report on Practice and 
Procedure in Defamation (the “Neill Report”), at 72-73.  
 There are also “many instances” in which plaintiffs are 
42   See the discussion in NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.19.  
43   Report of the Committee on Defamation (1975), UK, Cmnd 5909, Para 141 (the Faulks Committee). The 
Neill Committee made a similar observation: Supreme Court Procedure Committee (1991), Working 
Group on Practice and Procedures in Defamation, Para XIX4.  
44   NSWLRC Discussion Paper No 32, above n 38, Para 6.33.  
45   See, for instance, instruments referred to in above n 4.  
46   Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, at 269 (italics added).  
47   Robertson G and Nicol A (2002), Media Law 4th Edn, Penguin, London, at 109.  
48   Barendt E, Lustgarten L, Norrie, K and Stephenson H (1997), Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, at 195.  
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asked to prove negatives.49 There are even instances in which plaintiffs are asked to 
prove falsity, as in the tort of injurious falsehood50 and in the law of misrepresentation 
where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the falsity of the representation.51 The 
burden of proof in civil cases generally also stipulates that the “persuasive burden” lies 
upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.52
It is an ancient rule founded on considerations of good sense and should not be departed from 
without strong reasons. This rule is adopted principally because it is just that he who invokes 
the aid of the law should be the first to prove his case; and partly because, in the nature of 





The weight of the burden is more pronounced given that liability for unintentional 
defamation is a firm common law principle.54 Third, the present approach is inimical to 
freedom of speech: “From the more general perspective of freedom of speech there is 
no doubt that the present rule inhibits the ability of the media to expose what they 
believe to be matters of public concern”.55
…one can doubt whether it is reasonable to expect the defendant to show the truth of matters, 
in the nature of things generally outside his personal knowledge, rather than require the 
plaintiff to show the allegations are false. After all, the plaintiff will always know the truth 
about his or her conduct.
 Fourth, quite apart from the incompatibility 




Fifth, burden reversal supports a key aim of the defamation action – vindication. 
The “whole purpose” of defamation law is to enable a plaintiff to clear his or her 
name.57
                                               
49   Auburn J, Bagshaw R, Day D, Grevling K, Hochberg D, Hollander C, Mirfield P, Oakley AJ, Pattenden 
R and Whale S (eds) (2005), Phipson on Evidence, 16th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 131-133, 
discusses “statutory reverse burdens”, and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) on reverse 
burdens and presumptions (at 142-150).  
 An important consequence of reversing the burden by placing upon the plaintiff 
50   NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.19 (references omitted).  
51   NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.19 n 33. Barendt E (1993), “Libel and Freedom of Speech in 
English Law”, Public Law 449, at 457 makes a similar observation.  
  See further Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation (1974), 3rd Edn, 
Butterworths, London, Para 68, where the authors state that “the burden of alleging and proving falsity in 
fact, which alone turns a representation into a misrepresentation, rests on the party who sets it up”.  
52   Phipson on Evidence, above n 49, at 127. The authors’ description of the “persuasive burden” includes 
references to it as “the legal burden”, “the probative burden”, and “the ultimate burden” (at 125).  
53   Phipson on Evidence, above n 49, at 127 (italics added, references omitted). 
54   See Hulton v Jones [1910] AC 20.  
55   Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, at 269 (italics added). 
56   Phipson on Evidence, above n 49, at 196 (reference omitted). For a similar argument see NSWLRC 
Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.20. 
57   Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1994] 4 All ER 609, Lord Cooke, at 641. 
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the onus of proving falsity will be to make falsity “a central aspect of the claimant’s 
claim”.58 Taking into account that vindication is the primary purpose of defamation law 
and that truth plays a critical role in the human dignity argument for reputation,59
Adjudication on truth or falsity would facilitate the restoration of the reputation of an 
unjustly defamed plaintiff. It is the case that this adjudication takes place in any event if the 
defendant pleads justification for the law of defamation, but a failed defence of justification 
does not amount to a finding of falsity in favour of the claimant; all it implies is that the 
defendant has failed to prove as a matter of probability that the statement was true. This is not 
the same as a finding that as a matter of probability the statement was false.
 
reversing the burden honours more faithfully the core objective of defamation law. As 




Sixth, through some defamation defences the common law accepts the “chilling 
effect” argument and acknowledges that it is better to tolerate the damage occasioned 
by speech than to inhibit the publication of material which is of public interest (or 
public concern as will be argued below)61 and which may well be true.62 This 
acknowledgement, however, is confined to the defences of absolute and qualified 
privilege and excludes the truth and honest opinion defences.63
The defendant must prove the truth of the facts relied on if these latter defences are to be 
pleaded successfully. There is a presumption of falsity. The risk of a necessarily fallible legal 
process, in other words, is largely borne by the defendant. In view of the popular hostility to 
sections of the press that is quite a substantial risk.
 This exclusion places an 




B. Falsity burden and other approaches 
This section focuses on the falsity burden in three jurisdictions – the United States, 
England and Australia. Two contrasting approaches, with significant ramifications for 
the balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation are evident in 
these jurisdictions. On one side is the United States with a legal regime that favours 
freedom of speech over the protection of reputation. On the other side lies England and 
Australia, with a reverse approach. 
 
                                               
58   Milo (2008), above n 20, at 165. 
59   Milo (2008), above n 20, at 166. For a more detailed consideration of that argument see 33–41 (ibid). 
60   Milo (2008), above n 20, at 165–166. 
61   See heading C sub-heading 2 below.  
62   Barendt (1993), above n 51, at 456 (reference omitted).  
63   Barendt (1993), above n 51, at 456.  
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1. Falsity burden and the United States  
In stark contrast to the current Australian and English approach,65 the United States has 
made important strides towards protecting freedom of speech in its law of defamation. 
In the United States “anyone involved in a matter of public concern who sues the mass 
media for libel must now offer evidence of falsity to have a case.”66
Thus, the rule today is that to win a libel case resulting from the media’s coverage of any 
issue of public concern, the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving that the libellous 
statement is false. But what about libel cases not involving issues of public concern? The 
Supreme Court left that up to the states: the states are constitutionally required to place the 
burden of proof on plaintiffs only in cases involving public issues. However, some states 
have completely abandoned the common law rule that presumed all libellous statements to be 
false and now require all plaintiffs to prove the falsity of every allegedly libellous 
statement.
 This rule is closely 
linked to the ‘public figure’ requirement. This approach in a nutshell classifies people 
who may be legitimately targeted for scrutiny so that those falling into ‘public figure’ 
categories must yield varying concessions to freedom of speech interests. The US 
Supreme Court has revised the rules on truth as a libel defence, particularly shifting the 




In most US jurisdictions, however, plaintiffs suing in respect of a matter of private 
concern still enjoy the traditional protection.68
                                                                                                                                                  
64   Barendt (1993), above n 51, at 456.  
  
65   The common law of England carries a presumption of falsity although there has been discussion on this. 
However, an amendment (Defamation Bill 1996) moved in the House of Lords Committee stage to place 
the onus on the plaintiff to show falsity was defeated: see Phipson on Evidence, above n 49, at 195; and n 
156 below.   
  See also Barendt (1993), above n 51, at 457, where the author advances the argument that there is a 
logical basis for English courts to “alter the rules concerning the burden of proof, just as in the United 
States it is usually for the plaintiff to prove that the libel is false.”  
66   Holsinger R and Dilts JP (1997), Media Law, 4th Edn, McGraw-Hill, New York, at 163. This position 
was arrived at as a result of the New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) decision. In that case a 
police official sued the newspaper for publishing an advertisement placed by civil rights activists in 
which it was claimed that Negro students engaged in non-violent demonstrations were being met by an 
unprecedented wave of terror. The advertisement contained several false statements, some of which were 
minor inaccuracies. The police chief, who was not named in the advertisement, joined three others in 
suing the newspaper. The US Supreme Court affirmed and extended the burden on the plaintiff to prove 
falsity by holding in Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), that 
even private individuals who sue in connection with a matter of public concern must prove falsity. The 
majority said that to hold otherwise would have a chilling effect that would be contrary to the First 
Amendment’s protection of true speech on matters of public concern.  
67   Overbeck W (2007), Major Principles of Media Law, Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, at 127 (italics 
added).  
68   See, for instance, Garziano v EI du Pont de Nemours & Co, 818 F 2d 380 (5th Cir 1987). There, the 
plaintiff sued his employer who accused him of workplace sexual harassment and referred to the event in 
an information bulletin on sexual harassment. While the court agreed that the bulletin was protected by 
privilege, it found that there was no reason to spread that information in the community at large.  
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For some professional communicators, the common law of libel, with its easy assumption of 
falsity and harm, is still there and can be used by private individuals whose lives are 
needlessly defamed…Such plaintiffs need prove only identification, publication, and 
defamation. Harm and fault are assumed. From then on, the burden of proof is on the 
defendants to justify their acts, if they can.69
 
 
Thus, American defamation law “has not been completely brought under the 
realm of the First Amendment”70 which otherwise heavily influenced the way American 
defamation law has developed. Private individuals who are needlessly defamed are, as 
just noted, still protected by the common law of defamation “with its easy assumption 
of falsity and harm”. Importantly, for present purposes, in cases that involve matters of 
public concern, the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech has come to bear 
heavily on the development of defamation law.71 Its primary characteristic that is of 
relevance to the present discussion is the free speech priority achieved by way legal 
liability is designed. That is, the media benefits as a result of heavier burdens placed on 
plaintiffs than those shouldered by plaintiffs in jurisdictions such as England and 
Australia. The complete picture of the American plaintiff’s burden, with some 
qualifications to be seen shortly, is to show up to six elements: (a) the matter was 
published; (b) the words were of and concerning the plaintiff; (c) the material is 
defamatory; (d) the defendant is at fault (the defamation was published as a result of 
negligence or recklessness); (e) the material is false (a burden only for persons suing for 
defamation related to matters of public concern); and (f) personal harm (such as loss to 
reputation, emotional distress, or the loss of business revenues).72
                                               
69   Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 139 (italics added). As to the view in the quotation that fault is 
assumed see the discussion below under heading 3.3.2 where it is noted that “every person suing the 
media for libel must prove some level of fault.”  
  
70   Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 139. The First Amendment provides: 
  Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof: or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assembly, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  
71   The following forceful defence of freedom of speech expressed by the majority in Gertz v Robert Welch 
Inc, 418 US 323 (1974), at 339-340 provides a useful exposition of the principle: 
  However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s 
interest in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues (reference omitted). 
72   These six elements are cited by Middleton KR and Lee WE (2009), The Law of Public Communication, 
7th Edn, Pearson Education Inc, Boston, at 99; and by Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 163. 
Pember DR (2003/2004), Mass Media Law, McGraw-Hill, New York, at 136, however, cites only five 
elements (excluding the injury element).  
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The falsity and fault elements are “fairly recent additions” to American 
defamation law;73 and they only apply to cases that impinge on the First Amendment 
right to free speech.74 Nonetheless, in practice this means that “[m]ost plaintiffs have to 
satisfy all six elements of a libel suit.”75 Furthermore, even private-figure individuals 
must prove falsity provided that the action involves matters of a public concern. There 
is no longer any doubt that the First Amendment requires a private plaintiff to prove 
falsity against a media defendant that publishes matters of public concern.76
[T]he need to encourage debate on public issues that concerned the Court in the 
governmental-restriction cases is of concern in a similar manner in this case involving a 
private suit for damages: placement by state law of the burden of proving truth upon media 
defendants who publish speech of public concern deters such speech because of the fear that 
liability will unjustifiably result. Because such a “chilling” effect would be antithetical to the 
First Amendment’s protection of true speech on matters of public concern, we believe that a 
private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false 
before recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant.
 The US 
Supreme Court has held: 
77
The US approach has been described as the “clearest example of departure from 
the common law.”
  
78 This approach recognises that “requiring the plaintiff to show 
falsity will insulate from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably so” but such 
an approach has been justified primarily on the ground that the First Amendment 
requires the protection of some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.79 Thus, 
the US courts have been willing to insulate even “demonstrably false speech” from 
liability so as to provide “breathing space” for true speech on matters of public 
concern.80
                                               
73   Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 136-137. 
 This, however, does not mean that the media are given a carte blanche to 
74   Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 163. 
75   Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 100 (italics added). The burden of proof for private persons 
suing for defamation depends on state law (ibid, at 119).  
76   Hirth (2004), above n 22, at 542.   
77   Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 777 (references omitted).  
78   Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, at 269 n 22 citing Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 
12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986).  
79   Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 778.  
80   See Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 778. See further the 
view expressed in Hustler Magazine Inc et al v Jerry Falwell 485 US 46, at 52 (1988) (references 
omitted): 
  False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of 
the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be 
repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. But even though falsehoods have little 
value in and of themselves, they are "nevertheless inevitable in free debate," and a rule that would 
impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted 
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peddle falsity because once the plaintiff’s burden is satisfied the attention turns to the 
defendant and the inquiry then will “generally encompass evidence of the falsity of the 
matters asserted.81 It is probably an exaggeration to say that “the American rule may be 
said to be a rule whereby it is better that ten false publications remain unpunished than 
that one true one be suppressed.”82
 
 Given that the elements of falsity, fault and harm are 
not comprised in the Australian formulation of the cause of action, and also given that 
these elements considerably influence the fate of a defamation action in the USA, these 
three elements are considered below in more detail. 
(a) The requirement of proof of falsity  
The US defamation law position makes a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
persons and between matters of public and private ‘concern’. The governing principle, 
briefly stated, is as follows: “Public officials, public figures, and private persons 
involved in matters of public concern must prove not only recklessness or negligence to 
win libel suits but also falsity.”83 Private persons who are not involved in matters of 
public concern still must prove at least negligence but not necessarily falsity.84 That 
said, however, the plaintiff’s burden of proving falsity, where the burden arises, is not 
as onerous as it might appear, and “it may be somewhat easier to prove falsity than to 
prove fault.”85
                                                                                                                                                  
"chilling" effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value. 
"Freedoms of expression require ‘breathing space.'" This breathing space is provided by a 
constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can 
prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of 
culpability.”  
 In Philadelphia v Hepps the US Supreme Court said its decision “adds 
81   Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 778 (references omitted)).  
82   Schauer F (May 1980), “Social foundations of the law of defamation – a comparative analysis”, Vol 1 No 
1, Journal of Media Law and Practice 3, at 12. One Australian Law Reform Commission appeared to 
concur with Schauer’s view: see NSWLRC Discussion Paper No 32, above n 38, Para 10.12.  
  In any event the law’s accommodation of such lop-sidedness in burdens is well-acknowledged in the 
criminal standard of proof maxim: “For the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than 
that one innocent suffer” (Sir William Blackstone (1783), Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9th ed., 
Book 4, Chapter 27, at 358 (reprinted 1978)).  
83   Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 144 (italics added).  
84   See Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 776-777:  
 To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred we hold that the common-
law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages 
against a media defendant for speech of public concern…. 
85   Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 163.  
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only marginally to the burdens that the plaintiff must already bear”.86 Although the 
standard of proof for fault is that the evidence has to be clear and convincing, US appeal 
courts have held that falsity need only be proved by a “preponderance of the evidence,” 
that is, there need be only more evidence than not that the statements were false.87 If, 
however, the evidence indicates that the statements are true, they are not actionable, 
regardless of the extent of harm caused and regardless of the defendant’s motives. In 
Garrison v Louisiana the Supreme Court held that truth “may not be the subject of 
either civil or criminal sanctions where the discussion of public affairs is concerned.”88
 
  
(b) The requirement of proof of fault  
Given the close nexus between falsity and fault – the degree of journalist’s fault is said 
to be “the central issue” in many libel suits89 –  it is useful to consider the latter element 
in the American defamation scheme. Since the decision of the US Supreme Court in 
Gertz v Welch “every person suing the media for libel must prove some level of fault.”90 
The historical turning point in this area is the US Supreme Court decision in New York 
Times v Sullivan where the Court declared unconstitutional the common law of strict 
liability when the media defamed a public official.91 This decision, commonly referred 
to as the public figure defence, revolutionised and constitutionalised US defamation 
law, with its ruling that the robust political debate necessary in a democracy is 
inadequately protected by a common law requiring a libel defendant to prove the truth 
to overcome presumed falsity.92
                                               
86   Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 778.  
 Australian defamation law took a leaf out of the 
87   Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 163; Rattray v City of National City, 23 Med L Rptr 1779 (9th 
Cir 1995), cert filed, City of National City v Rattray, US No 94-2062; Goldwater v Ginsburg, 414 F 2d 
324, 1 Med L Rptr 1737 (2d Cir 1969).  
88   379 US 64, 85 S Ct 209, 12 L Ed 2d 1042, 1 Med L Rptr 1548 (1964).  
89   Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 117. Soloski J (1985), “The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who 
Sues for Libel?”, 71 Iowa L Rev 217, at 218, notes that in one study negligence or malice was the central 
legal issue in nearly ninety per cent of libel cases against the media.  
90   See Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, 418 US 323 (1974) (italics added).  
91   New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964).  
92   In Sullivan the US Supreme Court raised the burden of proof for public officials by introducing what has 
come to be called the New York Times actual malice. The Court said the First Amendment protects 
criticism of government officials even if the remarks are false and defamatory. The Court said that public 
officials cannot successfully sue for defamation unless they establish that defamation has been published 
with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.  
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Sullivan page in developing the implied freedom of political communication93 defence 
but did not go quite as far as the US did, partly because the “conceptual foundation” for 
the two approaches was deemed to be different.94 Even so, it is arguable that in addition 
to the First Amendment imperative, the extent of the leeway given to American 
defamation defendants is itself a product of the free speech-oriented interpretation of 
the First Amendment by US Courts, rather than being the product of an incontrovertible 
constitutional injunction.95
In the US, a further turning point came in Gertz v Welch,
  
96 which not only defined 
public figures but also eliminated the doctrine of strict liability in defamation law for 
private persons.97
                                               
93   For a discussion of Australia’s constitutional implied freedom of political communication, see what 
Chesterman M (2000), Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant, Ashgate Dartmouth, 
Hants, England, at 15, refers to as “the seven major ‘free speech’ cases in constitutional law which gave 
birth to the constitutional principles”: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian 
Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald and Weekly 
Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211; 
Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 124 ALR 121; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 
189 CLR 520; and Levy v The State of Victoria & Ors (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
 Since then the law has developed in a way that a defamation plaintiff 
– aside from proving defamation, identification and publication – must also prove that a 
media outlet erred in the preparation of a story. Since the Gertz v Welch decision every 
person suing the media for libel must prove some level of fault – plaintiffs cannot 
succeed unless they can show that the media defendant published “with fault, usually 
94   Levy v The State of Victoria & Ors (1997) 189 CLR 579, Kirby J, at 637: 
  The conceptual foundation for the constitutional freedom of communication in Australia is 
different from that derived from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as it has 
been interpreted (italics added). 
  See also Levy v The State of Victoria & Ors (1997) 189 CLR 579, McHugh J, at 622:  
  Unlike the Constitution of the United States, our Constitution does not create rights of 
communication.  
95   See, for instance, the view expressed by Brennan J for the majority in New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 
254 (1964), at 269: 
  The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First 
Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, 
“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people” (italics added, reference omitted).  
96   418 US 323 (1974). 
97   Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, 418 US 323 (1974). The term “public figure” has since undergone refinement 
so that a distinction is made between “public officials”; “public figures”; “limited, or ‘vortex’ public 
figures”; “involuntary public figures”; “public personalities”; and “private individuals”: see Holsinger 
and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 164-177. 
Second World Journalism Education Congress, 5-7 July 2010, South Africa/PAPER/submtd: 8 May 2010 18 
negligence for private plaintiffs, recklessness for public officials and figures.”98 This 
revolutionising of US defamation law, however, was not unbridled so as to leave the 
media free to wreak havoc on reputations. In respect of fault, once a court decides that a 
person is a public official, a public figure, or a private person, the focus of the case 
“turns to the question of fault, that is, whether communicators published the alleged 
libel carelessly or maliciously.”99 Private persons must prove that a publisher acted 
deliberately, negligently or carelessly, while public officials and public figures must 
prove that the publisher knew that the publication was false or published it with reckless 
disregard for the truth.100 A defendant who is a non-media entity private plaintiff, and is 




(c) The requirement of proof of harm  
Although the ‘harm’ element is not directly relevant for the purposes of the reforms 
proposed in this work, its role in the American defamation scheme is briefly noted here 
in the interests of gaining a complete picture of the “six” hurdles placed in the path of 
most American defamation plaintiffs.102 Proof of harm is the sixth element of a 
plaintiff’s defamation case in the United States: “A plaintiff cannot sue successfully 
over a harmless libel, although some harm to reputation may be ‘presumed’.”103
 
  
2. Falsity burden and England  
                                               
98   Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 117. Robertson and Nicol (2002), above n 47, at 75 described 
the US view of the English approach as follows: 
  What US courts found repugnant about United Kingdom law was how it placed the burden of 
proving truth on the defendant, and held him liable to pay damages for statements he honestly 
believed to be true and had published without negligence.  
99   Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 134 (italics in original). 
100  See Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), Stevens J, at 782, where 
his Honour referred to the principle in Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, 418 US 323 (1974), at 347:  
 While deliberate or inadvertent libels vilify private personages, they contribute little to the 
marketplace of ideas…it helps to remember that the perpetrator of the libel suffers from its failure 
to demonstrate the truth of its accusation only if the ‘private-figure’ plaintiff first establishes that 
the publisher is at ‘fault’ i.e. either that it published its libel with ‘actual malice’ in the New York 
Times sense (“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not,”) or that it published with that degree of careless indifference characteristic of negligence 
(references omitted).  
101  Holsinger and Dilts (1997), above n 66, at 139.  
102  See above heading 2A4.  
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Unlike in the United States, the English law of defamation remains weighted in favour 
of the plaintiff although in more recent times, as a result of a clamour for law reform in 
this area, the burden reversal crusade has gained new momentum and this is discussed 
below. In England, an earlier proposal to place the burden of proving falsity on the 
plaintiff made to the Faulks Committee was greeted by what Robertson and Nicol have 
described as a “pompous response”,104 that is, the Committee favoured the retention of 
the burden of proving truth on the defendant because it “tends to inculcate a spirit of 
caution in publishers of potentially actionable statements which we regard as 
salutary”.105 There is older English authority, however, in support of the view that the 
burden of proof of falsity should be on the claimant. One such authority comes from the 
late nineteenth century where “Lord Esher MR seemed to be departing from that 
general rule, and saying that the burden of proof of falsity was on the claimant.”106 
Additional support for this idea comes from an earlier case where it was held that the 
burden of proof of falsity automatically moved to the claimant seeking an interlocutory 
injunction.107 A leading American commentator writing at the time understood that the 
burden of proof was reversed in English law. Townshend summarised the English 
position as being that “the court will not in general interfere unless satisfied that the 
statements complained of in the document are untrue.”108 However, the transfer of the 
burden to the plaintiff did not gain acceptance, notwithstanding the celebrated position 
favouring freedom of speech taken in Bonnard v Perryman109
The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should 
possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful 
act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the 
 where the court 
underscored the freedom of speech imperative. Lord Coleridge CJ, delivering judgment 
of an impressive majority, said: 
                                                                                                                                                  
103  Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 145-6. 
104  Robertson and Nicol (2002), above n 47, at 109.  
105  Committee on Defamation, HMSO, 1975, Cmnd 5909, Para 141.  
106  Mitchell (2005), above n 31, at 94, citing William Coulson and Sons v James Coulson and Co (1887) 3 
TLR 846.   
107  Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Beall (1882) 20 ChD 501.  
108  Mitchell (2005), above n 31, at 94, citing Townshend (1890), A Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander 
and Libel, 4th Edn, New York, at 692. 
109  [1891] 2 Ch 269. 
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contrary, often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication and repetition of an 
alleged libel.110
In recent years, however, fuelled by the growing emphasis that both the common law 
and constitutional or quasi-constitutional instruments have been giving to freedom of 
speech, there has been a growing recognition of the need for reform: 
 
[Reform is] now clearly seen to be necessary to effectuate free speech as well as to bring libel 
law clearly into line with other civil actions. A reversal of the burden of proof is essential if 
the purpose of Article 10 is to be achieved, namely to inculcate a salutary spirit of caution in 
wealthy public figures who wish to use the law to silence their critics.111
 
 
This view was set in the English context where the view has been taken that “there is a 
constitutional right to freedom of expression.”112 In the Reynolds case Lord Steyn noted 
that the Human Rights Act 1988 (UK) “reinforced” the constitutional dimension of 
freedom of expression, and that that was “the backcloth” against which the defamation 
appeal before the court should be considered.113
The new landscape is of great importance inasmuch as it provides the taxonomy against 
which the question before the House must be considered. The starting point is now the right 
of freedom of expression, a right based on a constitutional or higher legal order foundation. 
Exceptions to freedom of expression must be justified as being necessary in a democracy. In 
other words, freedom of expression is the rule and regulation of speech is the exception 
requiring justification.




The free speech imperative has earned a place in the election manifestoes of 
Britain’s major political parties in the 2010 general elections. The three parties in their 
manifestoes pledged to “reform libel laws to protect freedom of speech” 
(Conservatives); “bring forward new legislation on libel to protect the right of 
defendants to speak freely” (Labour); and “protect free speech, investigative journalism 
                                               
110  Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, at 284 (Lord Esher MR, and Lindley, Bowen and Lopes LJJ 
concurring).  
111  Robertson and Nicol (2002), above n 47, at 109. Article 10 refers to the European Convention on Human 
Rights incorporated into English law by Section 12, Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). For a similar view 
about modern influences on freedom of speech see Tipping A (2002), “Journalistic Responsibility, 
Freedom of Speech and Protection of Reputation – Striking the Right Balance Between Citizens and the 
Media”, Vol 10 Waikato Law Review 1, at 2. See further Milo (2008), above n 20, at 156.  
112  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, Lord Steyn, at 628.  
113  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, at 628. 
114  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, at 628–629 (italics added). In the same 
case Lord Nicholls also made similar remarks. While Lord Nicholls appeared on the one hand to be 
referring to freedom of speech in relation to “political matters”, his Lordship also acknowledged on the 
other hand that one of the “contemporary functions of the media is investigative journalism [which] as 
much as the traditional activities of reporting and commenting, is part of the vital role or the press and of 
the media generally” (at 622, italics added). This latter formulation appears to protect freedom of speech 
more broadly. 
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[and provide] a robust responsible journalism defence” (Liberal Democrat).115 This was 
described as a “big boost”116 for libel campaigners. An earlier Ministry of Justice 
review that considered the push for reform, however, does not hold promise for the 
burden reversal argument proposed in this paper. That report focussed on “four 
principal areas in which the case for reform has been urged with particular emphasis in 
recent times”117 but none of the four principal areas directly pertain to burden reversal. 
Likewise, a slightly earlier consideration of the issue by the House of Commons, while 
acknowledging “the difficulties with the whole burden of proof being placed on the 
defendant”118 did not agree that “defendants should be required to prove the truth of 
their allegations.”119 One justification cited for this position was such a reversal would 
“often require claimants to prove a negative.”120 The example cited there for this 
justification is the case of Kate and Gerry McCann who were libelled repeatedly by the 
press in relation to their missing daughter.121
 
 The Committee’s reservation on this point 
can be easily disposed of – the McCann’s were not ‘public figures’ and, within the 
scheme of the proposals in this paper, would not be ideal candidates for the burden 
reversal principle.  
3. Falsity burden and Australia   
The prevailing position in Australia in this area is similar to the one in England. While 
Australia lacks an express constitutional premise for the protection of free speech such 
as the one recognised in England, several justifications may be cited for a reassessment 
of the present Australian position. The burden reversal was proposed more than a 
                                               
115  Respectively they are – Conservative Manifesto 2010, at 79. Retrieved 4 May 2010, from 
<http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Manifesto.aspx>; Labour Party Manifesto 2010, Chapter 9, at 9:3. 
Retrieved 4 May 2010,  from <labour.org.uk/manifesto>; and Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, at 93. 
Retrieved 4 May 2010, from <http://www.libdems.org.uk/our_manifesto.aspx> 
116  See Sweeny M and Hirsch A (2010), ‘Libel Law Reform Promised in Labour Manifesto’, The Guardian, 
12 April. Retrieved 14 April 2010, from <http:www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/apr/12/labour-manifesto-
libel-legislation?&CMP=EMCMEDIEML665>  
117  Report of the Libel Working Group, above n 9. The report noted that although the burden of proof was 
among the issues “recognised to be of significant interest” it was not discussed as a priority “given the 
limited time available” (at 44). 
118  House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Second 
Report of Session 2009-10, Volume 1, 24 February 2010, Para 135. 
119  Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Report, above n 118, Para 135.  
120  Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Report, above n 118, Para 134. See also text accompanying above n 
40 on this point. “prove a negative” 
121  Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Report, above n 118, Para 134. 
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decade ago by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission which recommended 
that “[i]n general falsity should be an essential ingredient of the cause of action” in 
defamation and that the “burden of proving that a defamatory imputation is false should 
rest on the plaintiff.”122 Some of the Commission’s justifications for this proposal 
were:123 (a) a failure to put falsity in issue could enable defamation law to be used to 
protect undeserved reputations; (b) speaking the truth should generally not give rise to 
civil liability simply because the truth is defamatory; (c) although the determination of 
truth or untruth of the defamatory imputation is the gravamen of the plaintiff’s 
complaint in most cases truth or falsity does not play a critical role on the present 
approach; (d) the plaintiff, who ‘knows the truth’, is better placed to prove falsity than 
the defendant to prove truth;124 (e) forcing the plaintiff to either litigate the issue of truth 
or concede it is consistent with the value that vindication comes primarily from a 
finding that a defamatory publication is false;125 and (f) freedom of speech would be 
facilitated.126
[I]t is only by making this change that the law of defamation can be made to fulfil its 
essential function of vindicating plaintiffs’ reputations in a way which not only addresses 
many intractable and long-standing problems of the law of defamation but also promotes the 
flow of accurate information.




The Commission also proposed two exceptions to the rule: (a) when the publication 
does not involve a matter of public concern; and (b) when the plaintiff establishes that 
the matter concerned is “not capable of being proved true or false”.128
These proposals have been largely ignored in the Australian legal framework and 
attention to or discussion on it has been cursory at best. For instance, even though it was 
claimed during the Australian defamation law reform exercise in the middle of the last 
decade that  “[t]he defence of truth has been the touchstone of reform focus”,
  
129
                                               
122  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, see Recommendations 5 and 7 and Para 4.1. 
 except 
for the introduction of a uniform truth and contextual truth defence into statute, the 
123  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Paras 4.7-4.20.  
124  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Paras 4.8-4.20 generally.  
125  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.11. 
126  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.12. 
127  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 1.16 (italics added).  
128  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 4.15. See also Para 4.22 and Recommendation 8. 
129  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG), “Proposal for uniform defamation laws” (July 2004), 
SCAG Working Group of State and Territory Officers, Item 4.9.4, at 23, in the discussion preceding 
Recommendation 14 (italics added).  
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Uniform Defamation Acts (UDA) made little headway in reforming the truth defence. 
The UDA introduced no new significant feature into the truth defence apart from 
substituting the truth alone defence for the truth plus defence in those jurisdictions, 
where only the latter had been available and codifying the contextual truth defence. The 
truth defence – “the principal defence to defamation actions”130
Since 1901, the common law — now the common law of Australia — has had to be 
developed in response to changing conditions. The expansion of the franchise, the increase in 
literacy, the growth of modern political structures operating at both federal and State levels 
and the modern development in mass communications, especially the electronic media, now 
demand the striking of a different balance from that which was struck in 1901.
 – has consistently failed 
to attract deeper reform scrutiny. This is unfortunate especially given the need for the 
law to keep abreast of changing conditions. As the Full Court of the High Court 




One explanation for why the truth defence has slipped under the reformers’ radar 
may be found in the view taken by the States and Territories Attorneys-General 
working group that “the reality is that truth is not in issue in the vast preponderance of 
matters that are litigated. In practice, the issue is hardly ever relevant.”132 This was a 
surprising position and was accordingly roundly contradicted by a prominent bar 
association, which said: “Truth is on very many occasions highly relevant”. 133 Another 
explanation for the absence of attention to substantive reform of the truth defence may 
lie in the duress that accompanied the UDA’s introduction. The UDA was introduced 
amidst “considerable pressure”,134 it was “probably defective [and based on] the lowest 
common denominator in relation to achieving uniformity”,135 because it was made up of 
a “hodge-podge”136 that “appears to have been cobbled together”137
                                               
130  ALRC Report No 11, above n 12, Para 120 citing Gatley, 7th Edition.  
 in the eastern States 
131  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ, at 565 (italics added).  
132  SCAG Working Group of State and Territory Officers, “Proposal for Uniform Defamation Laws”, above 
n 129, Item 4.9.4, at 23, in the discussion preceding Recommendation 14 (italics added).  
133  See New South Wales Bar Association in its Submissions to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General Working Group of State and Territory Officers, July 2004 Proposal for Uniform Defamation 
Laws.  
134  Pearson M (July 2007), “A review of Australia’s defamation reforms after a year of operation”, Vol 29(1) 
Australian Journalism Review 41, at 41. 
135  Hon V Chapman, Defamation Bill 2005 (South Australia), Second Reading, Debate, Hansard, 13 
September 2005, at 1840ff. 
136  Ackland R (2005), “Correction not cash”, The Walkley Magazine, Issue 32 April/May, at 37 
137  Hon Sue Walker, Defamation Bill 2005 (Western Australia), Consideration in Detail, State Legislative 
Assembly, Hansard, 15 September 2005, at 5486 
Second World Journalism Education Congress, 5-7 July 2010, South Africa/PAPER/submtd: 8 May 2010 24 
of Australia. Thus, the opportunity for achieving a truly “historic milestone”138
 
 in the 
development of defamation law as claimed by the States and Territories Attorneys-
General, was missed. 
C. Scope of matters of public interest: public figures; public concern  
Having examined the question of burden reversal above, we may now turn our attention 
to the three caveats placed on this proposal in this paper – that is, such burden reversal 
should occur only in instances where the burden shifts only in respect of defamatory 
publications where the complainant is a public figure; the matter complained about is a 
matter of public concern; and the legal action is against a media defendant. The term 
‘media defendant’ is potentially also problematic but is not within the scope of this 
paper. It may, however, be broadly stated that the term ‘media defendant’ for present 
purposes may defined to refer to defendants who are either individuals or a corporate 
entity and they are engaged in the publication of news and information or who practice 
the craft of journalism.139
 
 Given the potential for vagueness about the terms public 
figure and matters of public concern it is necessary to examine the two terms and to lay 
further groundwork for reform recommendations. At the outset, it is useful to emphasise 
that the term ‘public figure’ here is distinct from the term ‘matter of public concern’. 
The primary difference is that the former pertains to the person bringing the action and, 
for instance, that person’s conduct in relation to the matter that gives rise to the action 
whereas the latter pertains to the subject matter complained about. Each term is 
examined in turn below. 
1. Defining ‘public figure’  
This paper advocates a broad interpretation of what constitutes matters of public 
concern so as to give priority to freedom of speech but the test is amenable to 
proportionality controls. The American approach has been to classify people who may 
be legitimately targeted for scrutiny so that those falling into ‘public figure’ categories 
                                               
138  Hon Jim McGinty, Defamation Bill 2005 (WA), Introduction and First Reading, State Legislative 
Assembly, Hansard, 17 August 2005, at 4129.  
139  See, for example, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Commonwealth), s 202(5) where ‘journalist’ is 
defined as someone engaged in the profession or practice of reporting for photographing, editing, 
recording or making television or radio programs; or datacasting content of a news, current affairs, 
information or documentary character. This definition, appearing as it does in ‘broadcasting’ legislation, 
does not include the print medium. 
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must yield varying concessions to freedom of speech interests. The terminology 
commonly used to describe such a person is ‘public figure’. Such a person is 
distinguishable from a ‘private person’ in that the latter “does not meet the definition of 
a public official, an all-purpose public figure, or a limited-purpose public figure”140 
(these terms will be examined shortly). This, in turn, means that the plaintiff, being a 
private person, in most American jurisdictions is not required to prove that the 
defendant lied or exhibited reckless disregard for the truth in publishing the libel.141
The public figure test “has radically altered the cause of action in United States 
defamation law.”
  
142 It has also “been severely criticised both in the United States and 
Australia”143 and has been consistently rejected in Australia. The High Court in 
Theophanous case144 in Australia did entertain the prospect of a form of public figure 
test for Australia145 although the approach in the Lange case146 has led to the view that 
the High Court “unanimously dispensed with Theophanous without formally overruling 
it”.147 Or, as other commentators have put it: “the constitutional defence (established by 
Theophanous) disappeared without trace”;148
                                               
140  Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 180.  
 the High Court in Lange adopted “a 
141  Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 180. Most plaintiffs will only have to demonstrate that the defendant 
failed to exercise reasonable care in preparing and publishing the defamatory material, although there are 
a few exceptions to this rule. Varying burdens are placed on “private” plaintiffs in some states so that in 
these states (including California, Colorado, Indiana, Alaska and New York) they must prove a higher 
degree of fault than simple negligence when suing a media outlet for defamation based on a story about a 
matter of public interest (ibid, references omitted). 
142  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 5.7. 
143  See Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron 
JJ, at 134.  
144  Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104. 
145  See the view of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, 
Para 5.5, that the High Court’s decisions in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 
CLR 104 and Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211 “may establish a form of 
public figure test”.  
146  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
147  Potter R (1997), “Constitutional Defamation Defence Disappears as Theophanous Effectively 
Overruled”, Vol 16 No 3, Communications Law Bulletin 1, at 1. The author also notes that in Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, the High Court “said that it was arguable that 
Theophanous did not contain any binding statement of constitutional principle” (ibid).  
 
148  Gillooly (1998), above n 17, at 192. 
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change of analysis”;149 or the Theophanous defence “was abolished by the High Court 
in Lange”.150
The American approach to public figures remains attractive. As the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission noted, albeit on the basis of Theophanous, it is 
“essential to give consideration to the public figure test as it has developed in American 
jurisprudence and to the possible lines of development of Australian defamation 
law.”
  
151 The term ‘public figure’ in the American context envisages three categories of 
individuals who “should meet heavier burdens of proof when suing the media for libel 
than private plaintiffs”:152 (a) public officials;153 (b) all-purpose public figures;154 and 
(c) limited-purpose (or ‘vortex’) public figures.155 Of the three categories the last-
mentioned is the most contentious. Such public figures must meet three criteria: (a) the 
alleged defamation must involve a public controversy; (b) the plaintiff must have 
voluntarily participated in the discussion of that controversy; and (c) the plaintiff must 
have tried to affect the outcome of that controversy.156
                                               
149  Butler D (September 2000), “Lange revisited: exploring the implied freedom of communication 
concerning government or political matters”, Vol 5 No 2 Media and Arts Law Review 145, at 156.  
 The limited-purpose category 
150  Walker S (2000), Media Law: Commentary and Materials, 1st Edn, LBC Information Services, Pyrmont, 
NSW.  
151  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 5.6 (italics added). 
152  Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 127. See Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 181, for a useful 
summary of the three kinds of public persons.  
153  This refers to those who are at the very least among the hierarchy of government employees who have or 
appear to have a substantial responsibility to the public for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs: see Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75 (1966). In the four decades since the Sullivan decision, 
American courts have ruled that public officials include those elected to public office and non-elected 
government employees who play major roles in the development of public policy: see Middleton and Lee 
(2009), above n 72, at 123. See also Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 181. 
154  They “occupy positions of such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all 
purposes”: Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, 418 US 323 (1974), Powell J for the majority, at 345. Some 
examples of all-purpose public figures in the US are activist Jane Fonda, publishing mogul Ted Turner 
and actress Carol Burnett: see Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 128, for more examples. See also 
Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 181. It has been observed that on occasion plaintiffs “puffed up with 
self-importance, have happily admitted that they were all-purpose public figures”: Pember (2003/2004), 
above n 72, at 165, citing Masson v New Yorker Magazine Inc, 881 F 2d 1452 (1989). 
155  Gertz v Robert Welch Inc, 418 US 323 (1974), Powell J, at 345:  
 Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful 
action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. 
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the 
affairs of society.  
  Powell J found that the plaintiff in that case “did not thrust himself into the vortex” of the issue at hand 
(at 345).   
156  Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 129. 
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holds great utility for media defendants because it widens considerably the scope of 
those who may be considered public figures. Some US courts have conferred limited 
public figure status on entertainers, athletes and others who attract attention because of 
visible careers and many lower courts have held that those who seek public attention 
during their careers ought to have to prove actual malice when the alleged defamation 
relates to their public performances.157 In the US, businesses and corporations can sue 
for defamation, and so can also be classified as public figures in such an action.158
 
  
(a) Public figure and nature of the controversy 
The nature of the controversy that generated the libel is an important factor in 
determining whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure. Thus, the following 
qualifications have been made in American judicial decisions: (a) a public controversy 
is a dispute that in fact has received public attention because its ramifications will be 
felt by persons who are not direct participants;159 (b) the media is not permitted to 
manufacture a controversy with the purpose of ensnaring those participating in that 
controversy as limited-purpose public figures;160 and (c) not all issues that attract the 
public’s interest are controversies for the purpose of this test.161
 
 
(b) Public figure and extent of voluntariness  
The starting point is that it is critical, for the purpose of determining whether a person is 
a limited-purpose public figure, to establish whether the actions of the plaintiff involved 
in a controversy were voluntary.162 American courts, however, have been divided on 
what constitutes voluntariness and even lawyers who specialise in libel law find the 
decisions “often confusing”.163
                                               
157  Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 132.  
 The difficulties that give rise to contradictory judicial 
158  Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 176. 
159  Foretich v Capital Cities/ABC Inc, 37 F 3d 1541 (1994).  
160  Khawar v Glob International Inc, 965 P 2d 696 (1998).  This was a classic case of “bootstrapping, which 
is not permitted”: see Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 174. See also below n 164 below on this point.   
161  Time, Inc. v Firestone, 424 IS 448, 1 Media L Rep 1665 (1976). It has also been held that the outcome of 
a public controversy has “foreseeable and substantial ramifications” for those not directly participating in 
the debate while news coverage is an indication of a public controversy but is not of itself a sufficient 
criterion: Waldbaum v Fairchild Publications, 627 F 2d, at 1292, 5 Media L Rep 2629, at 2635-36.   
162  Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 174. 
163  Pember (2003/2004), above n 72, at 176. In Foretich v Capital Cities/ABC Inc, 37 F 3d 1541 (1994) the 
plaintiffs, who were publicly accused of sexually abusing their grand daughter, did not become public 
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findings are not insurmountable in Australia where, unlike the United States, a 
relatively uniform approach is taken in defamation law. It is suggested that for present 
purposes a potential plaintiff not be regarded as a public figure simply because he or she 
felt compelled to rebut accusations or was otherwise drawn into public discussion 
against their will.164 Thus, the mere existence of a public controversy does not give rise 
to a basis upon which to claim that all participants in that controversy are public 
figures.165 The public controversy must be a genuine dispute over a specific issue 
affecting a segment of the general public166
 
 and the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s 
participation in that issue should be taken into account.  
(c) Answering objections to the “public figure” test  
It is appropriate to briefly answer some objections made to the introduction of a public 
figure requirement into Australian defamation law. One objection is that the public 
figure test is a creature of American defamation law with its accompanying 
characteristics and is therefore unsuitable for adoption in Australia.167 Briefly stated, 
that argument is answered by the growing recognition in Australia that “freedom of 
expression is a fundamental tenet of a liberal democracy.”168 A second objection is that 
the public figure test does not effectively deter litigation by public figures, or promote 
free speech.169
                                                                                                                                                  
figures because they appeared at press conferences and public rallies to deny these charges. In Jewell v 
Cox Enterprises Inc, 27 MLR 2370 (1999), aff’d, Atlanta Journal-Constitution v Jewell, Ga Ct App, Nos 
A01A15b4-66, 10/01/01, however, a libel plaintiff who stepped into the controversy was a public person 
because he voluntarily stepped into the controversy by giving interviews to the press and was not merely 
defending himself against accusations that he had planted a bomb in a knapsack in a park during the 1996 
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta.  
 In reply, it is noted that in the United States there is a high incidence of 
164  On this point see the reference in above n 160 on “bootstrapping”. It is not unknown for the media to 
“bait” people into participating in a public controversy. That is, an individual may be reluctant to engage 
with a particular issue but may be forced to do so in order to counter deliberately planted misconceptions 
or misrepresentations. Evidence of such tactics is never easy to come by but the common media practice 
of relying heavily on media releases and material supplied by parties with vested interest illustrates the 
potential for the media to fall victim to manipulation.  
165  On this point see text accompanying above n 121.  
166  See Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 129.  
167  See NSWLRC Discussion Paper No 32, above n 38, Paras 10.1, 10.6 and 10.7-10.11. 
168  Australian Law Reform Commission (September 2007), Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion 
Paper No 72, Vol 3, Para 38.105.  
169  NSWLRC Discussion Paper No 32, above n 38, Para 10.6. Curiously the same Discussion Paper states:  
 The public figure test removes the “chilling” effect on the media by removing liability for even 
gross negligence, where stories about public figures are concerned. The test encourages 
publication and contribution to the flow of information available to the public (Para 10.39). 
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successful appeals by defendants and a high incidence of overturning or massive 
reductions of jury awards.170 Furthermore, a “significant aspect” of the Sullivan 
decision,171 which laid down new and more demanding criteria of liability for 
defamation actions brought by public officials in the US, “was its role in protecting 
critics of government action” from “an unwarranted and excessive penalty at the hands 
of a government official.”172 A third objection is that the public figure test causes 
undesirable side effects.173 One suggested example of this is that in the United States 
there is inadequate emphasis on the vindication of a reputation wrongly tarnished.174
…places little or no value on truth or care, and in fact encourages the dissemination of totally 
false information, which the media need not even investigate. The test thus encourages 
careless and irresponsible journalism and does not satisfy the public interest in fairness and 
accuracy.
 




Assuming that these are not extravagant claims it is suggested that concerns in this 
regard are well-addressed by the prevailing regulatory framework governing the 
Australian media. This framework includes the role played by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)176 and an extensive range of laws that 
impact on freedom of speech in Australia.177
                                               
170  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 5.16.  
 In response to the above concern about 
“inadequate emphasis on the vindication of a reputation wrongly tarnished” this paper 
advocates a restoration of defamation law’s vindicatory aim. This can best occur by 
171  The decision has been hailed as a victory for press freedom: see Lidsky LB and Wright RG (2004), 
Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, Praeger, Westport, Conn, at 
68.  
172  Chesterman (2000), above n 93, at 24–25. While the author notes the existence of a “substantial body” of 
critics of the Sullivan rule, the author also concedes that the critics “generally defend the aspirations of 
the Sullivan decision” and that dissatisfaction with the Sullivan rule is “by no means unanimous” (at 
157).  
173  NSWLRC Discussion Paper 32, above n 38, Para 10.6.  
174  NSWLRC Discussion Paper 32, above n 38, Para 10.28. 
175  NSWLRC Discussion Paper 32, above n 38, Para 10.39. 
176  ACMA requires broadcast service providers “to be responsive to the need for a fair and accurate coverage 
of matters of public interest”: see section 3(1)(g), Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Commonwealth). See 
further ACMA’s role in overseeing the broadcast sector’s complaints handling process provided for under 
section 3(1)(i). See also section 5(1)(b)(ii) which empowers ACMA to “deal effectively with breaches” of 
the rules established by the Act. 
177  See Moss I (2007), Report of the Independent Audit into the State of Free Speech in Australia, 31 
October. The report was commissioned by the “Australia’s Right to Know” Coalition, comprising major 
Australian news organizations. According to that Coalition Australian laws contain more than 500 
separate prohibitions and restrictions on what the public is allowed to know: see “The State of Free 
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ensuring that the defamatory material is neutralised by setting the record set straight, as 
“plaintiffs most want”.178 A fourth objection is that the American approach to public 
figures has created complex categories of plaintiffs.179 In response, it arguable that such 
categories are inevitable if we are to attain fairness in deciding the extent of leeway to 
allocate to freedom of speech. A fifth objection is that the public interest in the lives of 
“media personalities, prominent sports stars and such like” is not justified because 
“public interest in the lives of [such persons] is of a frivolous nature”.180 Apart from the 
slippage in the use of the term ‘public interest’ in this statement (to mean ‘public 
curiosity’ or ‘prurient interest’ as opposed to ‘public concern’) it is not within the 
contemplation of this paper that protection be offered to ‘frivolous’ publications but that 
the protection be restricted to matters of public concern. The sixth objection that the 
public figure test in the United States “appears only to contribute to the problems of 
lengthy and costly proceedings, with the sole emphasis on damages as a remedy”,181 is 
tenable only if we resort to a “wholesale importation of that package.”182
 
 This paper 
does not advocate an importation of such scale.  
2.  Defining ‘matter of public concern’  
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the use of the expression ‘public 
concern’ in the context of the present reform, rather than the more common term ‘public 
interest’, is deliberate, although occasionally it has been necessary to rely on the term 
‘public interest’ when citing authorities. The term ‘public concern’ is preferable for the 
purpose at hand. In a broad sense the argument for giving special treatment to matters of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Speech In Australia” (n.d.), Media Statement, released at the launch of the free speech campaign by 
Australia’s Right to Know Coalition. 
178  Chesterman (2000), above n 93, at 169.  
179  Chesterman (2000), above n 93, at 159. For another discussion opposing the public figure defence see 
Attorney-General’s Task Force on Defamation Law Reform (2002), Defamation Law – Proposals for 
Reform in NSW, at 14-23. Retrieved 17 December 2007, from: 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/pages/def_law_proposal> 
180  Western Australian Defamation Law Committee (September 2003), Committee Report on Reform to the 
Law of Defamation in Western Australia, Para 40.  
181  NSWLRC Report No 75, above n 18, Para 5.22. 
182  To borrow the words of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission itself: Report No 75, above n 18, 
Para 5.22. The term “package” in the NSWLRC’s usage referred to the US “public figure test” and the 
“package of reforms made in the wake of New York Times Inc v Sullivan” that provide special criteria 
governing liability for plaintiffs in particular categories, making it more difficult for those plaintiffs to 
establish a cause of action in defamation: see Paras 5.22 and 5.1. 
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public concern can be simply stated in the terms set out by Gillooly, albeit in a slightly 
different context:   
In the writer’s submission, it is of critical importance that the interests of a group [the 
recipients of defamatory communications] so intimately connected with defamation law be 
taken into consideration if we are to arrive at a balanced and coherent legal regime that meets 
the needs of society in the 21st century.183
 
 
‘Matters of public concern’ are determined by assessing the matter concerned by 
reference to the subject matter or nature of the topic, rather than the nature of the 
speaker, although often the divide between the two may be unclear. A wide range of 
topics have been said to qualify for inclusion as matters to which the implied freedom 
of political communication established in the Australian free speech cases applies.184 
Those topics are referred to by the common shorthand name – “matters of government 
and politics”.185 The meaning of the expression “communication about a government or 
political matter” is imprecise, but there is support for the view that nothing said in 
Lange derogates186 from those matters identified in Theophanous, where it was said that 
“political discussion” extended to “all speech relevant to the development of public 
opinion on the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about”.187 
However, the reasoning in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, given as it 
was in the context of qualified privilege, did not mean that qualified privilege extended 
to all matters of public interest.188
                                               
183  Gillooly M (2004), The Third Man: Reform of the Australasian Defamation Defences, Federation Press, 
Leichhardt, NSW, at 20. See further the author’s paper ‘Re-examining the Public Interest Imperative in 
News Evaluation’, presented at the Journalism Education Conference, 30 November –2 December 2009, 
Perth, Western Australia.  
 Such matters, it has been said, must be limited to the 
184  See above n 93.  
185  In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, the Full Court of the High Court 
said, at 559: 
 Freedom of communication on matters of government and politics is an indispensable incident of 
that system of representative government which the Constitution creates by directing that the 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be "directly chosen by the people" 
of the Commonwealth and the States, respectively (italics added). 
  For the range of matters that may be considered to be “matters of government and politics” see text 
accompanying n 190 below. See also Butler D and Rodrick S (2007), Australian Media Law, Lawbook 
Co, Pyrmont, NSW, at 79; George (2006), above n 29, at 295–296; Gillooly (1998), above n 17, at 190–
191.   
186  On this point note the views concerning the “overruling” of Theophanous referred to in the text 
accompanying n 147-150 above.  
187  Butler and Rodrick (2007), above n 185, at 79 (italics added).  
188  See also Peek v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 553; Herald and Weekly Times Ltd & 
Anor v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1.  
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extent that the text and structure of the Constitution establish it.189
It was held in Theophanous that the matters within the scope of the term “matters 
of government and politics” includes discussion about the conduct, policies or fitness 
for office of government members, political parties, public bodies, public officers and 
those seeking public office; the discussion of the political views and public conduct of 
persons who are engaged in activities that have become the subject of political debate, 
for example, trade union leaders, Aboriginal political leaders, political and economic 
commentators; and the concept is not exhausted by political publications and addresses 
which are calculated to influence choices.
 It is suggested here 
that the development of our defamation law need not be limited by similar 
considerations. ‘Matters of public concern’ includes but is a far broader term than 
matters relating to politics and government.  
190 In Theophanous, the High Court cited 
Barendt’s reference to “all speech relevant to the development of public opinion on the 
whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about” and added that “it 
was this idea which Mason CJ endeavoured to capture” in an earlier case when he 
referred to “public affairs” as a subject protected by the freedom (of political 
communication).191 The High Court also cited another eminent free speech advocate 
Alexander Meiklejohn’s view that freedom of speech “is assured only to speech which 
bears, directly or indirectly with issues which voters have to deal with – only, therefore, 
to the consideration of matters of public interest” but not to “[p]rivate speech, or private 
interest in speech”.192
The first public interest involved is that of the freedom of discussion in a democratic society. 
People cannot adequately influence the decisions which affect their lives unless they can be 
adequately informed on facts and arguments relevant to the decisions. Much of such fact-
finding and argumentation necessary has to be conducted vicariously, the public press being a 
principal instrument.
 Support for a broad approach to what should be considered 
available for public discussion can be found in the following observation by Lord 
Simon: 
193
                                               
189  See Brown & Ors v Members of the Classification Review Board of the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification (1998) 154 ALR 67, at 86.  
 
190  Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, 
at 124; Deanne J, at 179–180. See also Butler and Rodrick (2007), above n 185, at 79. 
191  Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, 
at 124, referring to Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, at 138–
140. The Barendt work cited in Theophanous was Freedom of Speech (1985), at 152. 
192  Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, 
at 124. 
193  A-G v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, at 315. 
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Importantly, that observation expands the scope of what may be considered 
matters of public concern beyond matters of politics and government to more broadly 
cover matters that affect people’s lives. Matters of public concern should not be limited 
to but should include the matters covered by the Lange scope which as noted earlier was 
made in the context of qualified privilege and not intended to be an exhaustive 
statement of what constitutes matters of public concern.  
 
(a) Scope of ‘matters of public concern’  
It is suggested that the notion of ‘matter of public concern’ should be applied broadly to 
enable a wide range of matters to qualify as matters of public concern.  Lord Denning 
MR in his classic statement on the meaning of matters of public interest favoured such a 
breadth: 
I would not myself confine it within narrow limits. Whenever a matter is such as to affect 
people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going 
on; or what may happen to them or others; then it is a matter of public interest on which 
everyone is entitled to make fair comment.194
 
 
American defamation law tends to prefer the term “public concern”195 to ‘public 
interest’ although the US Supreme Court “has never defined ‘matters of public 
concern’.”196 In the Bonnick case197 the Privy Council, building on the terminology in 
the Reynolds case, which dealt with qualified privilege,198 appears to have deliberately 
chosen the expression ‘public concern’ rather than the more familiar ‘public interest’.199
                                               
194  London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, at 391 (italics added). Also see Allsopp v Incorporated 
Newsagencies Co (1975) 26 FLR 238, at 244-5. For a more recent view on the attitude of the courts in 
England towards “public interest” see Milmo and Rogers (2004), above n 26, at 312:  
 
What then is the difference between ‘public interest’ and ‘public concern’? Tipping J 
 To a very large extent, whether an imputation relates to a matter of public interest or not is 
determined by value judgment, by the individual perception of the tribunal charged with the task 
of making the decision, and current mores and attitudes. The courts now treat many more matters 
as being of legitimate public concern or interest than would have been the case in the nineteenth 
century, a tendency accentuated by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
195  See, for example, Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US 767, 12 Med L Rptr 1977 (1986), at 777. 
See also Dun & Bradstreet Inc v Greenmoss Builders Inc, 472 US 749 (1985), at 758, where the US 
Supreme Court noted that it had long held that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, 
but that it is speech on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the First Amendment protection. 
196  Middleton and Lee (2009), above n 72, at 145. The common equivalent term ‘public interest’ has 
similarly also “never been defined” in English and Australian law: e.g. see Reynolds v Times Newspapers 
Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, Lord Nicholls, at 615.  
197  Bonnick v Morris & Others, Unreported, PC 30/2001, 17 June 2002.  
198  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609. 
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offered the following explanation, in the context of qualified privilege, for preferring 
‘public concern’ rather than ‘public interest’ citing the danger of slippage between the 
two terms: 
It is not necessarily in the public interest to publish to the world at large matters which are of 
interest to the public…The use of the word ‘concern’ does not necessarily signify worry, but 
it does signify that the subject-matter of the publication must be something about which the 
public is entitled to be informed. The subject-matter must be something about which the 
public has a right to know, as Lord Nicholls put it in Reynolds.200
 
  
A further ground is the confusion that tends to accompany the term ‘public 
interest’. This confusion takes two forms. One is as to the distinction between public 
and private interests. It has been colourfully noted that the media “are peculiarly 
vulnerable to the error of confusing the public interest with their own interest.”201 
Another may be identified as a possible misapprehension of the nomenclature.202
There are other public figures who exercise great practical power over the lives of people or 
great influence in the formation of public opinion or as role models. Such power or influence 
may indeed exceed that of most politicians. The rights and interests of citizens in 
democracies are not restricted to the casting of votes. Matters other than those pertaining to 
 It is 
suggested that the scope of matters of public concern should properly acknowledge the 
full range of matters that intelligent citizens should think about and this should include 
issues such as: child or sexual abuse; social misdemeanour by sports and entertainment 
personalities; substance abuse in sport; business relationships involving political 
personalities; and relationships that expose a conflict between public and private 
interests. As Lord Steyn noted, there is a compelling argument to expand the scope of 
matters of public concern beyond political discussion: 
                                                                                                                                                  
199  This was Justice Tipping’s observation: see Tipping (2002), above n 111, at 7.  
200  Tipping (2002), above n 111, at 7 (italics added). See also the justification for caution expressed by Kirby 
J in Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Mannock [2007] HCA Transcript 414 (7 August 2007), albeit in a 
slightly different context: 
 [S]ometimes it has been known for media items to parade as being concerned with great issues of 
social importance, but the actuality of the item is focused, in the nature of media today, on an 
individual and a sort of infotainment approach.  
201  Francome v Mirror Newspapers [1984] 2 All ER 408, Donaldson MR, at 413. See further the distinction 
drawn between matters that “the public takes great interest in”, on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
matters that “affect property of considerable value” and is of “public importance” going beyond the 
plaintiff and defendants and having “a very substantial character”: see Johansen v City Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd (1905) 2 CLR 186, Griffith CJ (delivering judgment of the Full Court), at 188. 
202  See, for instance, Pearson (July 2007), above n 134, at 50, where the author states that “journalists need a 
strong public interest defence to defamation”. This suggestion was made in the context of the adverse 
impact of various laws on the flow of information. The term “public interest” here was arguably used to 
justify greater press freedom. There is, however, another valid interpretation of the term – that the public 
interest requires a weighing up of competing public interests as a result of which the “public interest” 
may justify a curb on the flow of information in particular circumstances.  
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government and politics may be just as important in the community; and they may have a 
strong claim to be free of restraints on freedom of speech.203
 
 
The task of defining the scope of matters of public concern can be accomplished 
by the courts conducting an evaluation having regard to all the circumstances while 
ensuring that it does not supplant the editor’s role in the newsroom. The following 
proposition from Lord Nicholls, although it was expressed in the context of a privileged 
occasion, provides a useful basis upon which to approach the present task:  
Whether the public interest so requires depends upon an evaluation of the particular 
information in the circumstances of its publication. Through the cases runs the strain that, 
when determining whether the public at large had a right to know the particular information, 
the court has regard to all the circumstances. The court is concerned to assess whether the 
information was of sufficient value to the public that, in the public interest, it should be 
protected by privilege in the absence of malice.204
 
  
(b) Answering objections to the “matters of public concern” test 
Two main objections may be identified against the “matters of public concern” test 
proposed. First, it may be argued by defendants that this test is a constraint on freedom 
of speech because it is more demanding than the ‘public interest’ test. That is, it would 
impede the publication of matters that are of interest to the public. This argument is 
easily rebutted. The ‘public concern’ test does no more than draw attention to the need 
to provide greater protection to matters that the public may legitimately take an interest 
in, as opposed to matters of lesser import to public participation in public affairs.205
                                               
203  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, at 640 (italics added). 
 
Furthermore, as noted above, the media have themselves already committed to 
confining their reach only to matters of public concern. This is illustrated by the 
position taken by Australia’s peak press publishing entity – the Australian Press Council 
204  Reynolds v Times Newspapers & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, Lord Nicholls, at 617 (italics added). In the 
same passage Lord Nicholls cited Cox v Feeney (1863) 4 F & F 13, at 19, 176 ER 445, at 448, where 
Cockburn J approved an earlier statement by Lord Tenterden CJ that “a man has a right to publish, for the 
purpose of giving the public information, that which it is proper for the public to know” (italics added).  
  See also McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70, Tamberlin J, at 75–76: 
 The public interest is not one homogenous undivided concept. It will often be multi-faceted and 
the decision-maker will have to consider and evaluate the relative weight of these facets before 
reaching a final conclusion as to where “the public interest” resides. This ultimate evaluation of 
the public interest will involve a determination of what are the relevant facts of the public interest 
that are competing and the comparative importance that ought to be given to them so that “the 
public interest” can be ascertained and served. In some circumstances, one or more considerations 
will be of such overriding significance that they will prevail over all others. In other 
circumstances, the competing considerations will be more finely balanced so that the outcome is 
not so clearly predictable. 
205  See, for instance, Tipping J’s observation that it is “not necessarily in the public interest to publish to the 
world at large matters which are of interest to the public”: above n 111. 
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has acknowledged that “[f]reedom of the press carries with it an equivalent 
responsibility to the public”206 and further that it would give “first and dominant 
consideration to what it perceives to be in the public interest” in the sense of what 
people “might be legitimately interested in, or concerned about”.207
The second objection is that ‘matter of public concern’ is difficult to define.
  
208 
The rebuttal simply is that “what is in the public interest is a well-known and 
serviceable concept”.209 Furthermore, the adoption of the ‘matter of public concern’ test 
in the present context does not introduce a radical shift in burdens and this test is neither 
alien to defamation law nor to the truth defence itself. Importantly, the public concern 
requirement would not impose a heavy burden if it were given a reading that recognises 
the importance of freedom of speech.210
 
 In the context of the present reform scheme, if 
in fact the public concern requirement imposes a constraint on the media, it is a 
legitimate one.  
1. CONCLUSION 
The freedom of speech imperative for the present argument is well established and 
needs no further elaboration.211 In the English common law system, for example, 
freedom of speech is no longer a residual liberty but a legal principle to which the 
courts must pay attention.212
                                               
206  See the Australian Press Council commitment expressed in the preamble to its Statement of Principles 
shows (italics added). Retrieved 7 February 2008, from 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/complaints/sop.html> 
 In the freedom of speech scheme, the truth imperative 
occupies an important place not only in the freedom of speech scheme but in human 
207  Australian press Council Statement of Principles, above n 206.   
208  See, for example, text accompanying n 41 and 42 above, where the ALRC noted that the term is “an 
amorphous concept” and “impossible to define”: see Australian Law Reform Commission (1995), Open 
Government: A Review of the Federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, Report No 77, Para 8.13. 
209  See Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609, Lord Steyn, at 634. 
210  See for instance, Allworth v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 254, at 262-263:  
 What is or is not a matter of public interest may be interpreted widely or narrowly: see London 
Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, Lord Denning MR; cf Allsopp v Incorporated Newsagencies 
Co Pty Ltd (1975) 26 FLR 238, Blackburn J, at 244-245. It can be decided only by reference to the 
nature of the matter made public and the context of its publication. To say that a matter is of public 
interest is to say that it is not merely of private concern but a matter which properly might concern 
the ordinary reasonable reader as a member of the public.  
211  For example, see Barendt E (2007), Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Chapter 1. See also the freedom of speech commitments in England’s major political party manifestoes 
for 2010 (above n 115).  
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endeavour generally. The rule as to burden of proof in defamation proceedings, as Lord 
Lester expressed in forceful terms, is “derived from the Star Chamber’s concern with 
preserving peace is hardly consistent with modern day notions of freedom of speech”.213 
Lord Lester added: “The time has come to throw off the shackles of the Star Chamber 
and to adjust the law of defamation to contemporary notions of free speech.”214
Reputation, the cousin of respectability, is now regarded as less important than it was, since 
one is not supposed to care what other people think. Freedom of speech, on the other hand, is 
now regarded as more important than it was: to the utilitarian view that its effects are good 
(“the truth shall make you free”) is added the more modern hedonistic view that self-
expression is fun.
 The 
increased regard in which freedom of speech is held among the governed in democratic 
society is driven by utilitarian rather than hedonistic considerations: 
215
Furthermore, particularly in light of the legislative responses globally towards the 
so-called “threat of terrorism”, many encroachments, not all justified, have been made 
into individual rights and liberties.
 
216 Freedom of speech has been a notable casualty of 
such encroachments.217
                                                                                                                                                  
212  Barendt (2007), above n 211, at 41.  
 In defamation law the importance of truth is reflected in the 
principle in the Rofe case seen earlier – especially its dictum that no wrong is done to a 
213  See House of Lords Committee stage of the Defamation Bill 1996 (UK), 571 HL Deb, 2 April 1996, Col 
239. 
214  House of Lords Committee stage of the Defamation Bill 1996 (UK), 571 HL Deb, 2 April 1996, Col 241. 
215  Weir T (2000), A Casebook on Tort, 9th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 520 (italics added). See 
further Cusson v Quan [2007] ONCA 771, Sharpe JA (Weiler and Blair JJA agreeing), Para 122:  
 While evolution of the law of defamation has produced a variety of solutions in different 
jurisdictions, the evolution away from the common law’s traditional bias in favour of the 
protection of reputation is strikingly uniform (italics added).  
216  Chief Justice Terrence Higgins (2004), “Australia’s First Bill of Rights – Testing Judicial Independence 
and the Human Rights Imperative” (Speech), National Press Club, 3 March, noted in clearly forceful 
terms:  
 In the fight against terrorism, truly draconian legislation has been passed which allows anyone to 
be detained on the mere suspicion, held by the Attorney-General, that such detention will 
“substantially assist the collection of intelligence”…Various legislatures have passed enactments 
protecting various rights…But these measures, even taken together, provide no protection of even 
some of the most basic human rights (references omitted, italics added). 
  See also Pearson (July 2007), above n 134, at 50 where the author refers to the present era as “a time” 
when anti-terrorism laws, Freedom of Information exemptions and suppression orders “are all impacting 
on the reportage of important public issues”.  
217  See, for instance, the sweeping amendments to the country’s sedition laws effected through Schedule 7 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). In a subsequent review, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recommended that the term “sedition” should be removed from the federal statute book, and 
offences urging force or violence against the government or community groups should be redrafted: see 
Australian Law Reform Commission (2006), “‘Sedition’ should go, focus on urging violence: ALRC”, 
Media Release, 29 May. See further Australian Law Reform Commission (May 2006), Review of Sedition 
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person by telling the truth about that person.218 Defamation law is “weighted against 
defendants”.219 The practical operation of the defamation law generally – with its “low 
threshold”220 the plaintiff must cross to establish the action – and the onerousness of the 
truth defence in particular, exposes a disjuncture between the Rofe principle and the 
practical reality of its application. If, as the practitioners argue, truth is relevant in 
deciding whether to proceed at all to a hearing221
                                                                                                                                                  
Laws, Discussion Paper No 71; and Fernandez JM (2005) “Free speech and journalism: Australia Joins 
the Race to Tighten Up”, Vol XXXV No 1, Insaf, Malaysian Bar Journal 15.  
 the irrelevance of truth to the cause of 
action, and the relegation of concern for the truth to a later stage of proceedings, renders 
the procedure in respect of this defence highly unsatisfactory. A convenient and 
desirable remedy is to put truth in issue at the outset. The burden reversal of the kind 
proposed in this paper will achieve a balance that is consistent with the contemporary 
dictates of democratic society as to the desirable locus of the fulcrum on the freedom-of-
speech/protection-of-reputation scales.  
218  Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd (1924) 25 SR (NSW) 4: see text accompanying above n 13. See also 
M’Pherson v Daniels [1829] 10 B & C 263, Littledale J, at 272, where his Honour noted that truth is an 
answer to the action “because the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages in respect of an injury to a 
character which he either does not, or ought not to possess.”  
219  Burrows J and Cheer U (2005), Media Law in New Zealand, 5th Edn, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, at 29. 
220  Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper Co [1983] 1 NSWLR 699, Hunt J, at 723. 
221  New South Wales Bar Association’s Submissions, above n 133.  
